



Promising Avenues, False Starts and Dead Ends:
Global Governance and Development Finance
in the Wake of the Crisis

Ilene Grabel

November 2010

WORKINGPAPER SERIES

Number 241

**POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Gordon Hall
418 North Pleasant Street
Amherst, MA 01002

Phone: 413.545.6355
Fax: 413.577.0261
peri@econs.umass.edu
www.umass.edu/peri/



**PROMISING AVENUES, FALSE STARTS AND DEAD ENDS:
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
IN THE WAKE OF THE CRISIS**

November 2010

Ilene Grabel*
Professor of International Finance

Corresponding address:
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver
Denver, CO 80208, USA
Office: 303/871-2546; FAX: 303/871-2456; Email: igrabel@du.edu

*I am especially grateful for the very useful reactions to this research offered by George DeMartino, and also to participants at conferences or seminars at the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, the Political Economy Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, the New School for Social Research, the IDEAs conference in Muttukadu, India, and Cornell University. I benefited immensely from the research assistance of Stu Thomas.

Abstract: The paper examines three related questions. How is the crisis affecting the governance of the IMF and the influence that developing countries have within the institution; the policy space available to developing countries; and the prospects that alternative financial architectures will emerge as competitors or complements to the Fund? At this point it appears that IMF practice on capital controls has changed partly as a consequence of the crisis, that relatively autonomous developing countries are taking advantage of the policy space that has emerged, and that the global financial architecture is becoming more heterogeneous and multi-nodal. Developing countries do not yet enjoy more formal influence at the IMF as a consequence of the crisis. However, it is premature to conclude now that the formal and informal influence of developing countries will not increase in the coming years.

Key words: Global financial crisis; policy space for development; International Monetary Fund; capital controls; regional financial governance; global governance

JEL classifications: E65, F53, O23

Biographical note: Grabel is a Professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. She has worked as a consultant to the (UNDP)/International Poverty Centre, UNCTAD/G24, the UN University's World Institute for Development Economics Research, and with ActionAid and the NGO coalition, "New Rules for Global Finance." Grabel has published widely on financial policy and financial crises, the political economy of international capital flows to the developing world, the relationship between financial liberalization and macroeconomic performance in developing countries, central banking, exchange rate regimes, and the political economy of remittances. Grabel also blogs for the TripleCrisis (<http://www.triplecrisis.com/>).

1. INTRODUCTION

Has the current crisis altered the economic development landscape, as many have hoped? In part, this depends on the effects of the crisis on various dimensions of global financial governance vis-à-vis developing economies. Even before the crisis signs were emerging of changes in the institutions and processes that bear on global financial flows and other financial determinants of developmental policy space. The question to be addressed here is whether these changes have by now borne fruit? Has the crisis induced new beginnings in financial governance, or have the initiatives undertaken proven to be chimerical?

The heart of this paper examines three related questions. How is the crisis affecting the governance of the IMF and the influence that developing countries have within the institution; the policy space available to developing countries; and the prospects that alternative financial architectures will emerge as competitors or important complements to the Fund? I am particularly interested in highlighting those instances where we find some evidence of increasing policy space or alternative institutional arrangements as a consequence of failing institutions, changes in ideas, changes in the geography of influence in the global economy, or ambiguity that has emerged in the crisis environment.

It is too early, of course, to draw definitive conclusions about just how financial governance vis-à-vis developing countries will in fact evolve as a consequence of the crisis. But it is an appropriate moment to examine the promising avenues, false starts and dead ends that have already emerged. At this point it appears that IMF practice on capital controls has changed partly as a consequence of the crisis, that relatively autonomous developing countries are taking advantage of the policy space that has emerged, and that the global financial architecture is becoming more heterogeneous and multi-nodal. Developing countries do not yet enjoy more formal influence at the IMF as a consequence of the crisis, though it may be that their voting power will increase very modestly in 2012. It is simply too early to tell whether other changes at the IMF (particularly the emergence of developing countries as lenders to the institution) will ultimately reconfigure channels of informal influence at the institution.

2. IMF GOVERNANCE

The IMF has had a dominant and controversial role in financial governance from the debt crisis of the 1980s through the immediate aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Many Fund observers have hoped that the current financial crisis would create space for governance reforms at the institution. Governance changes at the Fund could involve changes of two sorts, formal and informal. On the formal level, there is the possibility of an alteration in the formal rules that condition voting rights and formal decision making at the institution. There is also the possibility of informal changes that bear on the relative influence of individual members over decisions and practices at the institution.

The IMF emerged from the Asian crisis a greatly weakened institution in regards to its credibility around the world, the adequacy of its own financial resources, the size of its staff, and the geographic reach of its programs. Critics on both the left and the right railed against the institutions' mission creep, heavy handedness, domination by the US government and by private financial interests, its myriad failures in East Asia prior to and following the crisis, and its excessively harsh and intrusive conditionality.

An important consequence of the Asian crisis and subsequent changes in the global economy was the loss of purpose, standing and relevance of the IMF. Indeed, prior to the current global financial crisis, demand for the institution's resources was at an historic low. Major borrowers (including Argentina, Brazil, and Ukraine) had repaid their outstanding debt to the institution and the Fund had contracted its staff by as much as 15% [Kapur and Webb, 2006; Thomas, 2009].¹ In fiscal year 2005, just six countries had Stand-by Arrangements (hereafter, SBAs)² with the Fund, the lowest number since 1975 [Kapur and Webb, 2006]. From 2003 to 2007, the Fund's loan portfolio shrunk dramatically: from \$105 billion to less than \$10 billion, while just two countries, Turkey and Pakistan, owed most of the \$10 billion [Weisbrot, Cordero and Sandoval, 2009]. The IMF's list of customers came to include primarily only extremely poor countries that had no choice but to seek its assistance [Chorev and Babb, 2009].

The current crisis has been good to the IMF [Chorev and Babb, 2009]. It has rescued the institution from its growing irrelevance by re-establishing its central role as first responder to financial distress for many countries. This re-empowerment has come about for a number of reasons. Even with reduced staffing, the Fund holds a monopoly position when it comes to experience in responding to financial distress in poorer countries.³ However, this may be starting to change. The regional and bilateral arrangements and institutions that have evolved in the developing world in response to the Asian crisis are beginning to substitute or complement the Fund in important ways (see section 4 below). Moreover, Fund staff may be acting on the presumption that this trend will accelerate in the future. For this reason, the IMF may be conducting itself somewhat differently at the current juncture simply as a way of maintaining its market share relative to its actual and perceived competitors (see below and fn4).

The G-20 has also contributed to the IMF's resurrection. The April 2009 meeting of the G-20 gave the IMF pride of place in global efforts to respond to the crisis. The meeting not only restored the IMF's mandate but also yielded massive new funding commitments to the institution to support its efforts (even if upon close examination these commitments are less than advertised, as Chowla [2009] demonstrates). Representatives committed \$1.1 trillion in funds to combat the financial crisis, with the bulk of it, namely, \$750 billion to be delivered through the IMF. The Fund continues to seek additional resources: indeed, as of July 2010, it was soliciting an additional \$250 billion, a matter to be taken up at the November 2010 G-20 leaders' summit in South Korea. It also bears noting that the global crisis has reinvigorated not only the IMF, but also other multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD.⁴

¹ Ukraine returned to borrower status in July 2010.

² SBAs are the IMF's basic short-term loan agreement.

³ Events in and on the periphery of the European Union (EU) have contributed substantially to the IMF's resurrection because the EU, European Commission and European Central Bank need the Fund's expertise, financial assistance and authority. Indeed, Lütz and Kranke (2010) argue that the EU has "rescued" the IMF by partnering with it on bailouts in Europe and by channeling its harsh conditionality circa the 1980s and 1990s.

⁴ For an interesting anecdote along these lines, see McElhiny [2009] for a description of how the Inter-American Development Bank's holiday party in 2008 celebrated the increased demand for infrastructure stimulus packages through a musical number performed by some Bank staff. See Kulish [2009] on the reinvigoration of the EBRD.

There is some evidence that the Fund is beginning to face competition from other institutions. For instance, Wade [2010:fn10] points out that the IMF is losing new business to the World Bank outside of the European rescues. And he notes that even in Europe,

New pathways of informal influence at the Fund

At the April 2009 G-20 meeting several developing countries committed to purchase the IMF's first issuance of its own bonds: China committed to purchase \$50 billion while Brazil, Russia, South Korea and India each committed to purchase \$10 billion. Thus, \$90 billion of the \$500 billion in new resources for IMF lending will come from countries that have traditionally not played an important role in Fund governance. The support for the Fund coming from developing countries is surely a landmark event at the institution. For our purposes what is most important about these new commitments is that they not only contribute to the Fund's resurrection, but they also reflect the global power and autonomy of these rapidly growing economies (see section 3 below). These changes in financial flows between member nations and the IMF may ultimately bear on the ability of these and other developing countries to exert influence at the institution in ways that change its informal and even its formal practices.

Adding to the potential that these new lenders may influence informal decision making at the Fund over time is the fact that the Chinese government is now behaving in a more "muscular" fashion on the global stage. This muscularity is reflected in many ways—for example, in the strong position it has taken in the face of US government claims that it is manipulating its currency, and thereby contributing to global imbalances. The appointment in February 2010 of Zhu Min, Deputy Governor of the Peoples Bank of China, as Special Advisor to the IMF's Managing Director provides another channel by which China (and perhaps other developing countries) may be able to influence informal decision making at the IMF in time.

Formal governance reform

Formal IMF governance has long been a point of contention among developing countries and civil society organizations. To date, progress on even modest governance reform at the Fund has been glacial. After nearly 12 years of pressure, the "Singapore reforms" of 2006 have resulted in inconsequential changes in the formal voice and vote of developing countries at the Fund. As a consequence of these reforms, the voting shares held by the US fell from 17% to 16.7%, by high-income countries from 52.7% to 52.3%, the voting shares of the BRIC countries plus Mexico increased from 10.1% to 11.1%, those held by China increased from 2.9% to 3.6%, and the voting shares held by the "rest of the world" (that is, 163 of 185 countries) dropped 0.5 percentage points from 37.1% to 36.6% [Weisbrot and Johnson, 2009].

The funding commitments made by developing countries to the IMF in April 2009 were not conditioned on specific governance reforms, though the matter was raised quite clearly by the institution's new funders, particularly Brazil and China. Indeed, senior Chinese officials said at the time that Beijing would be willing to contribute more money if China's quota were adjusted to reflect its economic weight, namely, by basing its quota on output per person [Landler, 3/30/09].⁵ The BRIC countries and the G-

Turkey broke off negotiations with the Fund in early March 2010 because of the severity of its conditions. A few weeks later the country negotiated a \$1.3 billion loan with the Bank.

⁵ See Woods [2010] for discussion of the position articulated by Brazil's Finance Minister. The Russian government appears a bit ambivalent on this matter. On many different occasions it has aligned itself with critics of IMF governance and it has certainly been among the most outspoken critics of the US' "exorbitant privilege" [on the latter, see Johnson, 2008]. But officials have

24 in fall 2009 proposed a 7% increase in quotas in favor of developing countries [Reuters.com, 9/15/09]. China proposed a far more ambitious goal for governance reform: in September 2009, central bank officials called for the establishment of a timeline to transfer 50% of the voting rights at the IMF and World Bank to developing countries.

The September 2009 G-20 meeting resulted, not surprisingly, in something far more modest: namely, representatives agreed to increase the quota share held by under-represented and developing countries by at least 5% at the IMF and by at least 3% at the World Bank. However, negotiations on this modest change stalled for a year owing to conflicts between the US and Europe and among European countries (as the IMF acknowledged, see IMF 2010c). In October 2010 the G-20 Finance Ministers appeared to regain some momentum on this issue when they agreed to transfer 6% of the voting rights at the Fund to developing countries by the fall of 2012. European representatives also agreed to cede two seats on the Executive Board. It is impossible to say at this point whether the stalemate between the US and Europe and among Europeans will emerge again so as to frustrate implementation of the voting reforms agreed to in the fall of 2010.

Another aspect of governance reform that was raised in the early days of the current crisis centered on long-held concerns about the process by which leaders of the IMF and World Bank have been selected. Developing countries have long chafed at the “gentlemen’s agreement” that has meant that the Fund’s director is a European and the World Bank’s director an American. The G-20 finance ministers reportedly agreed to end this practice at their March 2009 meeting in Sussex, England [Eichengreen, 2009a]. But discussion of this matter seems to have been sidelined at present.

Though the formal dimensions of IMF governance appear resistant to change, this does not mean that IMF governance is set in stone. Institutional change often happens slowly and informally. It may be that the new loans by developing countries and the new assertiveness of some developing countries will ultimately be seen as part of a gradual process that results in significant changes in Fund practice. Governance at institutions as complex as the IMF and World Bank depends largely on informal practices, power and know-how (such as expertise in using back-channels to exert influence). Admittedly, this realm of informal governance is not likely to change overnight. This suggests that the effects of any reform in voting shares will be long-term rather than immediate, and successful only to the degree that it is associated with other changes (in personnel, ideologies, and informal practices, continued competition from other institutions and arrangements).

3. POLICY SPACE IN RELATIVELY AUTONOMOUS STATES

As we have seen, the current financial crisis has resurrected the IMF and ushered in a substantial change in the sources of IMF funding. But we are also seeing an equally dramatic change in the geography of IMF activity. In fact, even if the crisis has served to restore the IMF’s influence in certain domains, this has occurred against the backdrop of a substantial diminution in the geography of the institution’s influence.

occasionally stepped away from positions taken by fellow BRIC countries. E.g., during the fall 2009 meeting of the IMF-World Bank in Istanbul, a Russian central bank official stated that the country’s purchase of IMF bonds would not be conditioned on IMF governance reforms [Reuters.com, 10/5/09].

As discussed above, policymakers across the developing world sought to insulate themselves from the hardships and humiliations suffered by Asian policymakers at the hands of the IMF. The explicit goal was to escape the IMF's orbit. They did this by relying on a diverse array of strategies: self-insuring against future crises through the over-accumulation of reserves; the attraction of international private capital inflows, including new sources of finance such as securitized remittances, and the establishment of swap arrangements among central banks; and a new reliance on trade finance, private investment and official development assistance from fast-growing developing countries such as China and Brazil [Kapur and Webb, 2006; Ketkar and Ratha, 2008; Economist, 15 July 2010]. The dramatic decline in the IMF's loan portfolio after the Asian crisis indicates the degree to which these escapist strategies proved to be successful. Even in the context of the current crisis, countries did their best to stay clear of IMF oversight. Indeed, during the current crisis, South Korea would have been a good candidate for a (precautionary) Flexible Credit Line with the Fund. But it did not apply for the credit line, presumably because of its prior experience with the Fund and to avoid the stigma of being one of its clients [Wade, 2010:fn10]. Instead, it negotiated a reserve swap with the US Federal Reserve (see section 4 below).

Those developing countries that have been able to maintain their autonomy during the crisis have used the resulting policy space to pursue a variety of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies and, lately, various types of capital controls [see Grabel, 2010]. Their ability to do so indicates the degree to which the IMF's geographic reach has been compromised in the years following the Asian crisis. Equally important for the matter at hand, the behavior of these autonomous states has served as an example for less powerful states which, in turn, have reacted to the crisis in ways that were taken to be unimaginable in previous crises.

The expansion of policy space: The case of capital controls⁶

The current crisis has achieved in a hurry something that heterodox economists have been unable to do for a quarter-century. It has provoked policymakers around the world to impose capital controls as a means to protect domestic economies from the ravaging effects of liberalized financial markets. What is perhaps more surprising and hopeful is that the new controls have been met variously with silence on the part of the IMF and the international business community and tacit acceptance of their necessity and prudence.

This reception contrasts sharply with the IMF and investor condemnation that was provoked when Malaysia imposed stringent capital controls during the Asian financial crisis. At the time the IMF called these controls on capital outflows a "step back" (Bloomberg, 6 May 2010), and a representative article in the international business press stated that "foreign investors in Malaysia have been expropriated, and the Malaysians will bear the cost of their distrust for years" [cited in Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001:11]. More recently, capital controls in Thailand were reversed by the Central Bank within a few days after their implementation in December 2006 (following a coup) after they triggered massive capital flight (Bloomberg, 6 May 2010).

In my view, the normalization of capital controls is the single most important way in which policy space for development has widened in several decades. Capital controls were the norm in developing and wealthy countries in the decades that followed WWII [Helleiner, 1996]. At that time, they were widely

⁶ See Grabel [2010] for an in-depth examination of capital controls during the current crisis.

understood by academic economists, policymakers and officials at multilateral institutions to be an essential tool of economic management. Policymakers deployed capital controls in order to enhance macroeconomic policy autonomy, promote financial and currency stability, protect domestic industries/sectors from foreign control or competition, and ensure the provision of adequate credit to favored sectors and firms at the right price [Epstein, Grabel, Jomo KS, 2004].

Capital controls fell out of favor in the neo-liberal era. Indeed, up until the Asian crisis the Fund was poised to modify its Articles of Agreement to make the liberalization of all international private capital flows a central purpose of the Fund and to extend its jurisdiction to capital movements. But despite the neo-liberal tenor of the times, some developing countries nevertheless maintained capital controls—most famously, Chile and Malaysia, but also China, India, Colombia, Thailand, and a few others.

Then a notable development occurred. In the wake of the Asian crisis, IMF research staff started to change their views of capital controls—modestly and cautiously to be sure. In the post-Asian crisis context, the center of gravity at the Fund and in the academic wing of the economics profession shifted away from an unequivocal, fundamentalist opposition to any interference with the free flow of capital to a tentative, conditional acceptance of the macroeconomic utility of some types of capital controls. Permissible controls were those that were temporary, market-friendly, focused on capital inflows, and were introduced only when the economy's fundamentals were mostly sound and the rest of the economy was liberalized [Prasad et al., 2003]. Academic literature on capital controls in the decade that followed the Asian crisis reflected this view: as Gallagher [2010a] points out, cross-country empirical studies (many of which are reviewed in Magud and Reinhart, 2006) offered strong support for the macroeconomic achievements of controls on inflows. Evidence supporting the achievements of outflow controls remains far more scant (though see Epstein et al. 2004, and on the success of outflow controls in Malaysia, see Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001 and Magud and Reinhart, 2006).

In the midst of the current global financial crisis, this change in sentiment accelerated. Policymakers in many country contexts quietly began to impose a variety of capital controls, often framing them simply as prudential policy tools (akin to what Epstein et al. 2004 termed “capital management techniques”). For example, at the beginning of October 2010, South Korea added to the controls that were initially implemented in June 2010. Beginning on October 19, regulators will audit lenders working with foreign currency derivatives. The goal is to reduce the financial instability and the recent currency appreciation caused by the capital inflows associated with these transactions. Also in October 2010, Brazil strengthened twice the capital controls it first put in place in October 2009. The new Brazilian controls triple (from 2 to 6%) the tax it charges foreign investors on investments in fixed-income bonds. Thailand also deployed capital controls in October 2010: authorities introduced a 15% withholding tax on capital gains and interest payments on foreign holdings of government and state-owned company bonds.

These controls follow on the heels of others. For example, Iceland implemented stringent controls just after its economy imploded in 2008, and the October 2008 SBA with the IMF made a very strong case for their necessity. In December 2009, Taiwan also imposed new restrictions on foreigners' access to some kinds of bank deposits (and China also put some new controls in place). In June 2010 Indonesia announced what its officials term a “quasi capital control” that governs short-term investment in the country. In the same month, Argentina and Venezuela announced controls on capital outflows. Argentina announced stricter controls on US dollar purchases, and Venezuela imposed new controls on access to foreign currency. Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine also put capital controls on

outflows in place to “stop the bleeding” caused by the crisis [IMF, 2009b]. Peru has been deploying a variety of inflow controls since early 2008. The country’s reserve requirement tax (which is a type of control on capital inflows) has been raised three times between June and August 2010.

In contrast to the situation that faced Malaysia and Thailand in the past, we see neither condemnation nor penalties associated with the recent capital controls. Indeed, the ideas of economists at the Fund on capital controls have continued to evolve quite significantly during the crisis with the consequent effect of normalizing this policy instrument. By now, many reports by IMF research staff and statements by the institution’s highest officials has made clear that capital controls are a legitimate part of the policy toolkit, and that they have had positive macroeconomic accomplishments in many countries. This view has been reiterated on countless occasions. Indeed, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn emphasized as much in a speech in Shanghai in October 2010, while in the same month the director of the Fund’s Western Hemispheric department made a case (unsuccessfully) for the use of controls in Colombia owing to the rapid appreciation of its currency. Moreover, we have seen no evidence that the capital controls deployed across the developing world of late have had ill effects on investor sentiment. Indeed, foreign investors have continued to flood these markets even after new controls are announced.⁷ The credit rating agencies, too, have not responded to controls in ways that discourage or penalize policymakers from using this tool.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate just why the views of IMF staff on capital controls have evolved so significantly. But it is likely that some combination of these factors is responsible: (1) a pragmatic recognition by IMF leadership and staff that the institution has no effective choice but to amend its policy prescriptions, owing to its diminished influence in the developing world (per the above); (2) relatedly, concern at the IMF about existing and future competition with other national, multilateral and regional financial architectures that are coming to play a greater role in the area of crisis management (see discussion in section 4 below); (3) the influence of leading academic economists, who themselves have come to question and in some respects reject the traditional neo-liberal prescription for development; and (4) the current global financial crisis, coming just a decade after the Asian crisis, may be having the effect of encouraging those economists at the IMF (and the World Bank) who have long had reservations about the neo-liberal model to give voice to their concerns and to assert themselves more effectively. It is important to keep in mind in this connection that like any complex organization, the IMF comprises diverse constituencies that may very well disagree among themselves about some fundamental matters pertaining to the institution’s strategies.

The current crisis has had a powerful effect on policy space for developing countries. It has dramatically furthered and normalized the use of capital controls, a process that began (unevenly) after the Asian crisis. At the same time, policymakers in a growing number of developing countries are exploiting the policy space that the IMF’s diminished geography of influence is offering them.

One important caveat is in order here. The argument that I advance regarding the normalization of capital controls at the IMF should not be read to suggest that the institution has conducted itself in an exemplary and entirely new fashion during the current crisis. Elsewhere I argue that in several important respects the Fund’s conditionality programs during the current crisis evidence strong continuity with the

⁷ Certainly investor enthusiasm for developing country markets stems from the attractive returns available, especially in comparison to the dismal opportunities and prospects of the US, Europe and Japan at the present time.

policy adjustments that the institution put in place during the Asian and the Mexican financial crises of the 1990s. Today, the IMF continues to apply pressure to secure compliance with stringent, pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy targets.⁸ Moreover, despite rhetoric by Fund staff to the contrary, expansive forms of conditionality (that involve e.g., privatization, market liberalization, labor market and pension system reform) have also returned as a key feature of recent Fund programs. Finally, the greater degree of fiscal flexibility granted by the Fund in some country contexts (particularly on the Eastern side of the European periphery) has little to no practical significance.⁹

4. NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURES? THE G-20 AND REGIONAL AND BILATERAL INITIATIVES

As with the Asian crisis, the current crisis has promoted interest in alternative modes of financial governance. Indeed, the crisis has stimulated the expansion of existing institutions and arrangements and the emergence of new ones. Collectively these innovations suggest that the global financial architecture is becoming multi-nodal and heterogenous, even if some of these arrangements ultimately prove untenable in the long run. It may be that innovations in IMF practice on capital controls and ultimately in its formal governance stem (partly) from attempts to protect the institution's franchise from perceived or actual competition.

The G-20

The formation of the G-20 in the early moments of the financial crisis initially seemed to signal the emergence of a new global financial architecture that was more pluralistic and inclusive than the old one, dominated as it was by the US, other wealthy countries, and the IMF.¹⁰ This new grouping gave countries such as Brazil, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa a seat at the proverbial table, along with the usual G-8 countries.

Optimism on the significance of the G-20 was particularly high in its early days when its chief spokespeople seemed to be channeling the spirit of Keynes in calling for ambitious measures to counter the crisis and the power of the financial community. Declarations about the death of the Washington consensus and the need to increase the voice and vote of developing countries at the Bretton Woods institutions also contributed to the early promise of the G-20.

⁸ A large number of recent studies of the SBAs (and other assistance programs) negotiated during the current crisis have established that the IMF has promoted pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy adjustments or targets [UNICEF, 2010; Van Waeyenberge, Bargawi and McKinley, 2010; Muchhala, 2009; Eurodad, 2009; Solidar, 2009; Weisbrot et al., 2009]. Indeed, only two studies conclude otherwise, and both are self-congratulatory reports by the Fund [IMF 2009a, 2009e].

⁹ See Grabel [2010] for discussion of both the continuities and the discontinuities in Fund practice during the current crisis.

¹⁰ Some observers were disappointed from the start with the organization's lack of inclusiveness, e.g., Payne [2010] and its timidity, e.g., Woods [2010]. Others remained cautious, e.g., Helleiner and Pagliari [2009] and Helleiner and Porter [2009]. Helleiner and Pagliari [2009] argue that the first G-20 Leaders Summit in Washington DC in November 2008 might ultimately be remembered for giving G-20, rather than G-7, leaders "a seat at the table." However, the authors are careful to note that this legacy will only matter if the seats turn out to be real rather than symbolic. In a related vein, Helleiner and Porter [2009] describe the increased representation of developing countries on many bodies that constitute the global financial regulatory architecture (namely, the Financial Stability Board, the IASB, the Technical Committee of the IOSCO and the BCBS) that came about as a consequence of the November 2008 G-20 Leaders' Summit. However, they are also careful to note that membership in these key bodies, though expanded, still privilege larger over smaller developing countries.

However, optimism on the G-20 quickly shifted to disappointment as its Keynesian moment passed, and its leaders began to call for restoring fiscal balance in June 2010. However, we must recognize that it is premature to declare the G-20 a dead end. It is, after all, an entirely new grouping, and it may take time for new member countries to find ways to operate within it effectively.

Significant architectural changes

The experience of East Asian countries with the IMF during the Asian crisis was the catalyst for two developments. First, as discussed above, it led many countries (in Asia, but also elsewhere) to self-insure against future involvement with the Fund via the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Second, it stimulated a great deal of interest in the creation of regional alternatives to the Fund that could provide support during financial distress absent the painful and politically-difficult conditionality imposed upon Asian borrowers. In what follows we will see that the current crisis has been far more productive than the Asian crisis in terms of propelling financial innovations that may ultimately lead to a more decentralized, pluralistic, and heterogeneous financial architecture.

Many observers have viewed both the Asian and the current crisis as an opportunity to rethink the global financial architecture so that regional, sub-regional and multilateral arrangements play a greater, complementary role in promoting financial stability and financial inclusion. For example, this view was articulated forcefully in the Monterrey Consensus of 2002. Writing after the Asian crisis, Mistry [1999] argues that regional crisis management capacity could usefully complement national and global measures. Writing before the current crisis and based on experiences in Europe and the Andean region, Griffith-Jones, Griffith-Jones and Hertova [2008] conclude that there is a need for new or expanded regional and sub-regional development banks to fill gaps in the international financial architecture.¹¹ In the early days of the current crisis, the Stiglitz Commission [UN, 2009, ch.V] called for a new global monetary system built from the “bottom up” through a series of agreements among regional arrangements. In a related vein, Ocampo [2010a] argues that improving economic and social governance necessitates the creation of a dense network of world, regional and national institutions in which regional and sub-regional institutions play a role between global and national financial arrangements [see also Ocampo 2010b, 2006].

Some observers have taken heart in early signs that the crisis is stimulating decentralization of the financial architecture (e.g., Helleiner, 2010; Woods, 2010; Tussie, 2010). Chin [2010], by contrast, is less sanguine about the signs of emergent regionalism. He concludes that regional responses have emerged only modestly, especially in connection with lender of last resort assurances, financing for balance of payments crises, or currency stabilization. Instead, he finds that when the crisis emerged, East Asia and South America turned quickly to unilateral and bilateral rather than to existing regional mechanisms. That said, Tussie [2010] argues that we are in the middle of a period of transition to a more diverse and multi-tiered global financial and monetary system.

¹¹ Their preliminary calculations show that regional development banks could provide additional annual lending of approximately \$77 billion if developing countries allocated just 1% of their reserves (which at the time they wrote equaled \$32 billion in reserves) to paid-in capital for expansion of existing or the creation of regional development banks.

In what follows we sketch the types of regional and bilateral initiatives that have emerged in the context of the crisis.

Regional initiatives

The East Asian crisis awakened interest in regional financial architectures in the developing world. That crisis gave voice to an aborted proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund that eventually formed the basis in 2000 for the bilateral swap agreements that are at the heart of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The CMI is a potentially important regional architecture involving ASEAN nations, China, Japan and South Korea. The current financial crisis has been a powerful impetus for expanding the scope of the CMI. In early 2009 the CMI was “multilateralized,” such that it is now known as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, CMIM. The CMIM is a \$120 billion regional currency reserve pool from which member countries can borrow during crises. China, Japan and Korea provide 80% of the CMIM’s resources (with China and Japan each contributing 32% to the pool or \$38.4 billion). Decisions regarding disbursements from the fund are to be made by simple majority, and voting shares are to be allocated roughly in proportion to a country’s contributions. Importantly, this means that unlike the IMF’s Executive Board (which makes decisions by consensus), no single country can block action.¹²

The transformation of the CMI to the CMIM is significant because it increases the scope of central bank currency swaps and reserve pooling arrangements in the region. This introduces the possibility that countries that are members of the CMIM will not need to turn to the IMF when they face liquidity crises in the future. It may also eliminate (at least partly) the perceived need by individual member nations to over-accumulate official reserves for purposes of self insurance.

There is one critical and difficult matter that must be resolved before the CMIM can ever challenge the IMF in the region. That is the matter of regional surveillance and conditionality: at the behest of creditor countries, disbursements from the CMIM in excess of 20% of the credits available to a country require that a borrowing country must be under an IMF surveillance program (i.e., the IMF must review and sign-off on release of CMIM funds beyond this 20% threshold). The swaps available under both the CMI and the CMIM have yet to be activated. Indeed, during the current crisis South Korea negotiated a one-year swap arrangement with the US Federal Reserve in October 2008 for \$30 billion rather than avail itself of the resources available to it under the (then) CMI.¹³

Recent experience of the EU demonstrates that devising and implementing regional surveillance and conditionality is a daunting task since it involves criticizing the policies of neighbors and demanding substantive changes in behavior. Since political sensitivities (and rivalries) among Asian neighbors run even higher than in the EU, the design of a regional surveillance mechanism will likely require protracted negotiations (especially among China, Japan and South Korea), thereby possibly limiting the extent to which the CMIM will fully displace IMF governance in the region in the near future. But perhaps the evident costs of the EU’s failure to resolve the surveillance matter in Europe will give CMIM members the motivation to take up the matter seriously before the next crisis.

¹²Description drawn from Henning [2009]. .

¹³ Korea could have accessed \$3.7 billion under the CMI. To have accessed the full amount available to it, namely \$18.5 billion, the country would have had to be under an IMF agreement [Sussang Karn, 2010]. Experience with the Fund during the Asian crisis made that politically infeasible.

Among regions in the developing world, Latin America has long had the greatest number of regional and sub-regional institutions in its financial architecture. It is therefore unsurprising that the crisis has moved the region further in this direction. In addition, the re-emergence of more populist governments and the success of large commodity exporters in the region have also stimulated the growth of regional, sub-regional and bilateral initiatives.

One such initiative is the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), an institution that was founded in 1978 as the Andean Reserve Fund to serve countries in the Andean region. It is based in Colombia, and its members include Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Perú, Uruguay and Venezuela. FLAR acts largely as a credit cooperative that lends to members' central banks in proportion to the capital contributions [Chin, 2010:fn40]. FLAR has a capitalization of just over \$2.3 billion. Prior to the crisis, FLAR lending to member countries was significant in comparison to IMF lending: indeed, from 1978 to 2003, FLAR loans of \$4.9 billion were almost 60% of the size of the loans from the IMF to the same countries (\$8.1 billion) [Chin, 2010:fn41]. During the current crisis, FLAR made liquidity credit lines totaling US \$1.8 billion available to member country central banks that confronted the effects of the current financial crisis [McElhiny, 2009]. For example, Ecuador's central bank drew on FLAR resources in April 2009 by drawing on a three-year loan of \$482 million. However, FLAR's potential may be limited at this point by the fact that it involves a small number of countries, and the region's largest economy, Brazil is not a member and has kept itself at a distance from this institution (as well as from the Bank of the South) [Chin, 2010].

Another initiative that bears mention is the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). Most Latin American countries and some countries in the Caribbean are members of CAF. It is owned exclusively by developing countries (with the exception of Spain). CAF has assets of \$4.12 billion. CAF loans have grown exponentially since 2000. Since 2001, CAF has been the main source of multilateral project financing for Andean countries (providing over 55% of multilateral financing), and since 2006, over 50% of its lending went to infrastructure. [Griffith-Jones, Griffith-Jones and Hertova, 2008]. CAF made a record number of approvals in 2009 [Tussie, 2010].

Brazil and Argentina have also sought to resurrect the Agreement on Reciprocal Payments and Credits (CCR), an arrangement that involves bilateral lines of trade credit between the 13 central banks that are members of the Latin American Integration Association.¹⁴ The CCR has functioned since 1966, though it was not terribly significant in regional trade finance during the 1980s and 1990s. The agreement was given new life during the current crisis when in April 2009 its guaranteed coverage was increased from \$120 million to \$1.5 billion.

Two new Latin American initiatives that bear mention are the Bank of the South (BDS) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). The future of these new initiatives is unknown at this point insofar as each is in its infancy. The BOS is an institution developed by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and headquartered in the country. BOS has received a great deal of attention because it has been situated rhetorically as a rival to the IMF. At this point, however, the rivalry remains aspirational rather than practical.

¹⁴ Details on CCR drawn from Chin [2010].

The BDS was founded in 2007, and was officially launched in 2009 when the 4 member countries of MERCOSUR (namely, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and the Union of South American Nations (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) agreed on the details necessary to get the Bank off the ground.¹⁵ According to the agreement, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela will capitalize the Bank with contributions of \$2 billion each, Uruguay and Ecuador with \$400 million each, and Bolivia and Paraguay with \$200 million each. The Bank will grant all of its member countries the same level of voting power, though loans of more than \$70 million will require approval of countries that represent at least 2/3 of the bank's total capital (something that Brazil apparently insisted upon) [Phillips, 2010]. BDS enters into force in 2012 when the parliaments of member countries ratify the institution's founding agreement.

Some observers view the BDS as the main component of a new regional financial architecture with several components, including greater cooperation in the region and increased use of its currencies [Vernengo 2010, citing Pedro Paez-head of the Ecuadorian Presidential Commission for the New Financial Architecture]. Notwithstanding visions of its future, it bears noting that by the time of its launch in 2009, the mandate of the BDS had been narrowed to providing "project-finance" in the region (i.e., providing longer-term lending for development projects in agriculture, energy, health care, infrastructure, and trade promotion) [Chin, 2010]. Lender of last resort emergency finance is not included in its existing mandate.

ALBA involves eight Latin American countries. It is led by Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia, though Nicaragua, Dominica, Honduras, Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbados are members as well. This is a regional initiative designed to promote new, non-market structures, the creation of an integrated trade and monetary zone, and a regionally created currency, the sucre [see Hart-Lansberg, 2010]. Several ALBA countries have already deposited agreed upon amounts of their currencies into a special sucre fund. Sucre exist now as a unit of account only, and are being used for targeted trade of specific commodities. The first sucre-denominated transaction involved Venezuelan rice exported to Cuba in Jan 2010; in July 2010, Ecuador and Venezuela conducted their first trade (for rice from Venezuela to Ecuador) using the virtual currency (Dow Jones, 2010).

Regional development banks

Prior the current crisis, the Asian Development Bank was already lending more than the World Bank inside the region, and the Inter-American Development Bank and FLAR were already providing more crisis-related financing in South America than the IMF [Woods, 2010]. The crisis accelerated this trend. The Asian, Inter-American and African Development Banks have responded to the crisis in their regions in some cases more quickly and with larger loans than we have seen from the IMF and the World Bank, and they have also introduced new types of temporary rapid financing programs and counter-cyclical lending facilities to support developing and low-income countries [Chin, 2010; Woods, 2010].

The activism of the multilateral institutions was facilitated by the G-20's decision in April 2009 to devolve a portion of the new financial commitments made to the IMF to regional (multilateral) institutions.¹⁶ Indonesia proposed in April 2009 that a portion of the IMF's new financing be devolved to the Asian Development Bank. With G-20 backing, the Asian Development Bank introduced a new

¹⁵ Details on membership, funding and voting rights at the Bank of the South from Phillips [2009] and the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development [2009].

¹⁶ Details in this paragraph from Chin [2010], except where noted.

countercyclical instrument, the Counter-cyclical Support Facility, to provide support of up to \$3 billion to economies affected by the crisis in Asia. In total, the Asian Development Bank approved \$8.8 billion in crisis support through a range of programs to countries in the region [ADB, 2009]. Regional development banks in other parts of the developing world quickly followed the Asian Development Bank's example, and were granted a portion of the new funds committed to the IMF to establish new regional lending facilities to promote rapid counter-cyclical support within their regions. The African Development Bank established a \$1.5 billion emergency liquidity facility, and the Inter-American Development Bank established a \$6 billion program to support the countercyclical efforts of member governments. A privately financed entity, the Arab Monetary Fund, introduced a new short-term loan facility for crisis stricken countries. Five loans were made under this facility in 2009 for a total of \$470M (up from \$132M in 2008) [Arab Monetary Fund, 2009].

Bilateral responses

The current crisis has galvanized numerous bilateral mechanisms that provide diverse types of financial support to countries in distress outside the framework of the IMF. Indeed, Chin [2010] notes the enduring reliance on bilateral and national measures over regional arrangements for emergency financing.

At the outset of the current crisis, Russia provided modest support to some regional neighbors [Henning, 2009]. The US Federal Reserve since December 2008 has opened temporary swap agreements with fourteen central banks (building on long-standing swap agreements with the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Mexico), including several in East Asia and Latin America. For example, Mexico now has a \$30 billion currency swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve [Banco de México, 2009]. The EU contributed significant funds to the SBAs of many neighboring economies (e.g., Iceland, Hungary, Latvia).

China has entered into numerous bilateral financial initiatives during the current crisis, though these are largely aimed not at lender of last resort functions, but rather to support the country's trade relations during the economic downturn and to ensure access to strategic natural resources in the years to come. For example, during spring 2009, China doubled a development fund in Venezuela to \$12 billion, lent Ecuador at least \$1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant (via a credit line with the China Development Bank), and lent Brazil's national oil company \$10 billion.¹⁷ Other Chinese deals have involved three-year currency swap arrangements that allow some of its trading partners to maintain reliable access to the Chinese currency (so that they can continue to pay for imports from the country in RMB rather than in US dollars), while ensuring that Chinese firms can pay for goods from trading partners in their currencies. For example, China has made arrangements to ensure that Argentina has access to \$10 billion of RMB, and it has made the same kinds of arrangements with South Korea (\$26.3 billion)¹⁸, Indonesia (\$14.6 billion), Belarus (\$2.9 billion), Hong Kong (\$29 billion) and Malaysia (\$11.7 billion).¹⁹ Note that these bilateral swap arrangements do not challenge the role of the IMF (or the dollar for that matter) directly since the central banks of these countries cannot use the RMB to intervene in foreign exchange

¹⁷ Details on these Chinese investments and currency swaps are drawn from Romero and Barrionuevo [4/16/09], Chin [2010]. On the credit line with Ecuador, see FLAR [2010].

¹⁸ South Korea also negotiated a two year \$20 billion swap with Japan [Chin, 2010].

¹⁹ In July 2009, China also started to allow selected firms in five Chinese cities to use RMB to settle transactions with businesses in Hong Kong, Macau and ASEAN countries. Foreign banks will be allowed to buy or borrow Chinese currency from mainland lenders to finance such trade. During the crisis, Brazil and China also signed an agreement to settle trade using the RMB and the real.

markets, import merchandise from third countries,²⁰ or pay foreign banks or foreign bondholders because the currency remains inconvertible [Eichengreen, 2009b].

Like China, Brazil and Argentina have moved to settle their trade transactions with one another in their own currencies (rather than using the US dollar as an intermediary). In October 2008 they signed a bilateral ‘Payments System on Local Currency’, which allows exporters and importers from both countries to settle their transactions in Brazilian real and Argentine pesos [Gnos and Ponsot, 2009]. Under this settlement mechanism, exporters can set prices in their home currency, and thus be insulated from foreign exchange risk. The system now covers 20% of trade [Tussie, 2010]

Brazil’s National Bank of Economic and Social Development (Portuguese acronym, BNDES) eclipses all other national lending institutions in Latin America in terms of its assets—in 2007 its assets totaled \$14.07 billion. This places the institution’s assets behind those of the region’s major multilateral bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, which had assets of \$20.35 billion in 2007 [Chin, 2010]. BNDES has been extremely active during the crisis. Since the start of the crisis, BNDES has lent some \$15 billion to countries in the region [Woods, 2010].

BNDES has also moved both outside the country and outside the region. It has provided a growing amount of finance to countries in the Caribbean and Africa (as has China’s Development Bank) [Chin 2010:697]. In August 2009, BNDES opened its first branch office in South America, in Montevideo, Uruguay [Chin 2010:710]. The World Bank has also partnered with BNDES to arrange new financing packages: the World Bank arranged for a \$4 billion in new loans in Brazil, including a three-way loan for Brazil in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank and BNDES (Chin 2010:710). BNDES loans to developing countries from 2008 through the first quarter of 2010 reached \$1.5 billion (though foreign aid from Brazil is channeled via other mechanisms as well), and BNDES’ rate of new lending now far exceeds that of the World Bank disbursements.²¹

5. LOOKING AHEAD

In light of all of these details it might be useful to recap here. We have seen that the global financial crisis has meant that the IMF has discovered new vitality as a first-responder to economic distress. Whether the IMF will use its renewed influence and financial resources in old ways (that is, in ways that constrain policy space in poorer countries and that reflect the interests and ideologies of its most powerful member nations) or in new ways (that expand the space for policy heterogeneity) will depend on many factors, not least of which is how and to what extent developing countries are able to use the financial crisis to continue to press for the expansion of their formal voting rights and their informal influence at the Fund.

The newly resurrected institution faces a changed landscape. It no longer enjoys wall-to-wall influence across the developing world. The geography of IMF influence is, at present, significantly curtailed as a consequence of the rise of relatively autonomous states in the developing world and the emergence of

²⁰ The only exception is that the RMB can be used in cross-border trade with China’s immediate neighbors or the special administrative regions of Hong Kong or Macao.

²¹ See Economist [July 15, 2010] on BNDES and Brazilian aid more generally, and Economist [August 5, 2010] for discussion of controversies regarding some of BNDES’s loans in connection with the country’s 2010 federal election.

new financial architectures. Equally important, even within its orbit of influence its economists are responding to the current crisis in some ways that diverge from their recent past practice (as we have seen in the case of capital controls).

We also see that policymakers are muddling through the crisis (Colander, 2003)—experimenting, among other things, with diverse types of institutional arrangements and ad hoc initiatives. From these strategies just might emerge a widely diverse platform of new arrangements that are tailored to the diverse contexts that policymakers face across the developing world. At this point, it remains unclear just how significant the architectural changes surveyed here will prove to be as competitors to the IMF.

But what is clear is that the status quo ex ante no longer seems to be a possibility. It is becoming more apparent by the day that the financial architecture or architectures that emerge out of the crisis will be heterogeneous, multi-nodal and will provide for substantially greater policy space for developing countries than we have seen in recent decades. That said, barring any substantial change in the global political economy it will very much remain the case that only some developing countries will be so positioned so as to take advantage of this new autonomy. The most difficult policy challenge will be to address the most pressing needs of those states that lack the resources, geopolitical power and or inclination to pursue a truly developmentalist path.

References

- Adam, Shamin and Dan Ten Kate. 2010. "Asia should consider capital controls to stem asset-bubble risks, UN says." Bloomberg, 6 May.
- Asian Development Bank. 2010. ADB Annual Report 2009. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
- Arab Monetary Fund. 2010. Arab Monetary Fund Annual Report 2009. Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund.
- Banco de México. 2009. "Press Release: Banco de México announces the extension of swap line with the US Federal Reserve." Banco de Mexico. www.banxico.org.mx/sitioingles/.../25jun2009swapsing.pdf, June 25.
- Chin, Gregory. 2010. "Remaking the architecture: The emerging powers, self-insuring and regional insulation." *International Affairs* 86(3): 693-715.
- Chorev, Nitsan and Sarah Babb. 2009. "The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO." *Theory and Society* 38(5): 459-484
- Chowla, Peter. 2009. "The potential development implications of enhancing the IMF's resources." G-24 Policy Brief No. 47. <http://www.g24.org/pbno47.pdf>
- Colandar, David. 2003. "Muddling through and policy analysis." *New Zealand Economic Papers* 37(2): 197-215.
- Dow Jones 2010. Venezuela, Ecuador make trade with 'sucre' rather than US dollar. July 7.
- Economist. 2010. "Speak softly and carry a blank cheque." *The Economist*. <http://economist.com/node/16592455>, 15 July.
- Economist. 2010. "Nest egg or serpent's egg?" *The Economist*. http://www.economist.com/node/16748990?story_id=16748990, August 5.

- Eichengreen, Barry. 2009a. "Out of the Box Thoughts about the International Financial Architecture.", IMF Working paper: Strategy, Policy, and Review Department No. 116. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09116.pdf>.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 2009b. "Dollar Dilemma." *Foreign Affairs* 88(5): pp. 53-68.
- Epstein, Gerald, Ilene Grabel and KS Jomo. 2004. "Capital Management Techniques in Developing Countries: An Assessment of Experiences from the 1990's and Lessons for the Future." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 27. www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420043_en.pdf.
- Gallagher, Kevin. 2010a. "Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 58. ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/KGCapControlsG-24.pdf.
- Gnos, Claude and Jean-Francois Ponsot. 2009. "New Financial Architecture and Regional Monetary Integration in Latin America." Paper Presented at the International Conference: International Political Economy and the New Regulations of Globalization. Poitiers, France, May 14-5.
- Grabel, Ilene. 2010. "Not Your Grandfather's IMF: Global Crisis, 'Productive Incoherence,' and Developmental Policy Space." Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper No. 214. <http://www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/297fe4ef4df84c2d7d803500cf1cb21f/publication/395/>.
- Griffith-Jones, Stephany, David Griffith-Jones and Dagmar Hertova. 2008. "Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 50. www.g24.org/sqj0907.pdf.
- Hart-Landsberg, Martin. 2010. "ALBA and Cooperative Development: Lessons from the European Payments Union." *Marxism* 21(7(3)): 387-425.
- Helleiner, Eric. 1996. *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Helleiner, Eric. 2010. "A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007-2008 Crisis and the Future of Global Finance." *International Affairs* 86(3): 619-36.
- Helleiner, Eric and Stefano Pagliari. 2009. "Towards a New Bretton Woods? The First G20 Leaders Summit and the Regulation of Global Finance." *New Political Economy* 1(2): 275-87.
- Helleiner, Eric and Tony Porter. 2009. "Making Transnational Networks More Accountable." In Friedrich Ebert Foundation, *Redefining the Global Economy. Dialogue on Globalization* Occasional Papers No. 42. New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Henning, C. Randall. 2009. "The Future of the Chiang Mai Initiative: An Asian Monetary Fund?" Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No. PB09-5.
- International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development. 2009. "Latin American countries commit US\$ 7 billion for 'Bank of the South'." *Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest* 13(17), May 13. <http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/46561/>.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2010c. "IMF Governance Reform." Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and the Legal Department, July 7. www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/070710.pdf.
- IMF. 2009a. "Review of Recent Crisis Programs." Strategy, Policy, and Review Department. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/091409.pdf>.
- IMF. 2009b. Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. New York: IMF.
- IMF. 2009e. "Creating Policy Space—Responsive Design and Streamlined Conditionality in Recent Low-Income Country Programs." Strategy, Policy and Review Department. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/091009A.pdf>.

- Johnson, Juliet. 2008. "Forbidden Fruit: Russia's Uneasy Relationship with the Dollar." *Review of International Political Economy* 15(3): 379-98.
- Kaplan, Ethan and Dani Rodrik. 2001. "Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?" NBER Working Paper No.8142, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Kapur, Devesh and Richard Webb. 2006. "Beyond the IMF." Paper for G-24 Technical Group Meetings, March 2006. www.g24.org/weka0306.pdf.
- Ketkar, Suhas and Dilip Ratha (eds.) 2008. *Innovative Financing for Development*. Washington DC: World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934_1110315015165/%5Be-book%5DIInnovative_Financing_for_Development.pdf.
- Kulish, Nicholas. 2009. "Global Economic Crisis Rescues European Bank," *New York Times*, October 8.
- Landler, Mark. 2009. "Rising powers challenge US on IMF role." *New York Times*, March 30
- Lütz, Susanne and Matthias Kranke. 2010. "The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus: EU and IMF Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries." London School of Economics, LEQS Paper No.22.
- Magud, Nicholas and Carmen Reinhart. 2006. "Capital Controls: An Evaluation." NBER Working Paper No.11973.
- McElhiny, Vince. 2009. "Global Crisis is Good News for IFIs in Latin America." Bank Information Center. IFI Info Brief, January 9.
- Mistry, Percy. 1999. "Coping with Financial Crises: Are Regional Arrangements the Missing Link?" in UNCTAD, *International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s*. New York: United Nations.
- Molina-Gallart, Nuria. 2009. "Bail-Out or Blow-Out? IMF Policy Advice and Conditions for Low- Income Countries at a Time of Crisis." Eurodad. www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats_New/Reports/Bail-out%20or%20blow-out.pdf.
- Muchhala, Bhumika. 2009. "The IMF's Financial Crisis Loans: No Change in Conditionalities." Third World Network. <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/par/IMF.Crisis.Loans-Overview.TWN.March.2009.doc>.
- Ocampo, Jose Antonio. 2010a. "Rethinking Global Economic and Social Governance." *Journal of Globalization and Development* 1(1): Article 6.
- Ocampo, Jose Antonio. 2010b. "Special Drawing Rights and the Reform of the Global Reserve System." G-24. www.g24.org/jao0909.pdf.
- Ocampo, Jose Antonio. 2006 (ed.). *Regional Financial Cooperation*. New York: United Nations and Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Olarte, Maria Alejandra. 2010. "Ecuador Subscribes Credit Line with China." FLAR. <https://www.flar.net/ingles/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=186&conID=2722>, accessed October 29, 2010.
- Payne, Anthony. "How many Gs are there in 'global governance' after the crisis? The perspectives of the 'marginal majority' of the world's states." *International Affairs* 86(3): 729-40.
- Phillips, Tony. 2009. "South American Nations Agree on Technical Rules for Bank of the South," Americas Program, Center for International Policy, May 29. <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2009/03636.pdf>, accessed October 28, 2010.
- Prasad, Eswar, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei and M. Ayhan Kose. 2003. "Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence." IMF. www.imf.org/external/np/res/docs/2003/031703.pdf.

- Reuters.com. 2009. "Russia IMF bond buy not dependent on reform." Reuters.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSL47415720091005>, October 5.
- Romero, Simon and Alexi Barrionuevo. 2009. "Deals help China expand its sway in Latin America." *New York Times*, April 16.
- Solidar. 2009. Doing a decent job? IMF policies and decent work in times of crisis,
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats_New/Reports/Doing%20a%20decent%20job.pdf, October 5.
- Sussangkarn, Chalongphob. 2010. "The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, Development and Outlook." ADBI Working Paper Series No. 230.
- Thomas Jr., Landon. 2009. "Known for tight spending, IMF may loosen reigns." *New York Times*, April 5.
- Tussie, Diana. 2010. "Decentralizing Global Finance." TripleCrisis Blog. <http://triplecrisis.com/decentralizing-global-finance/>.
- Stiglitz Commission. 2009. "Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress." Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf.
- UNICEF. 2010. "Prioritizing Expenditures for a Recovery with a Human Face: Results from a Rapid Desk Review of 86 Recent IMF Country Reports." Social and Economic Policy Working Brief.
- Van Waeyenberge, Elisa, Hannah Bargawi, and Terry McKinley. 2010. "Standing in the Way of Development? A Critical Survey of the IMF's Crisis Response in Low-Income Countries." Eurodad and Third World Network.
<http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/reports.aspx?id=4083>.
- Vernengo, Matias. 2010. "We need new global financial bodies." *The Progressive*.
<http://www.progressive.org/mpvernengo051110.html>, May 11.
- Wade, Robert. 2010. "The State of the World Bank." *Challenge* July-August: 1-25.
- Weisbrot, Mark and Jake Johnson. 2009. "IMF Voting Shares: No Plans for Significant Changes." Center for Economic and Policy Research: Issue Brief. www.cepr.net.
- Weisbrot, Mark, Jose Cordero and Luis Sandoval. 2009. "Empowering the IMF: Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund's Resources?" Center for Economic and Policy Research: Issue Brief. www.cepr.net.
- Woods, Ngaire. 2010. "Global Governance after the Financial Crisis: A New Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers?" *Global Policy* 1(1): 51-63.
- Xin, Zhou and Chris Buckley. 2009. "China wants support on IMF voting at G20." Reuters.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE58E29D20090915>, September 15.