November 09, 2021 | Working Paper
  • Headline: Labor Precarity in China’s Online Ridehailing Sector
  • Intro Text: Since 2017, China has adopted the "tolerant and prudent" policy in regulating emerging digital platform industries. Wei Zhang, Hao Qi and Zhongjin Li conduct an analysis for the cities of Nanjing and Beijing that finds that although these regulations can help reduce labor precarity in the marketplace for licensed drivers, they have exacerbated precarity in the workplace. This is because the ridehailing platforms aligned with third-party rental companies that provide licensed vehicles. This has forced drivers bounded by a rental or rent-to-own agreement to work significantly longer hours than counterparts who drive their own vehicles.
  • Type of publication: Working Paper
  • Research or In The Media: Research
  • Research Area: Asian Political Economy
  • Publication Date: 2021-11-09
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  • Authors:
    • Add Authors: Wei Zhang
    • Add Authors: Hao Qi
    • Add Authors: Zhongjin Li
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Regulated Market, Trapped Workers: The Impacts of the "Tolerant and Prudent" Policy on Labour Precarity in China’s Online Ridehailing Sector

Abstract

Since 2017, China has adopted the "tolerant and prudent" policy in regulating emerging digital platform industries. The impacts of this policy on labour precarity have been rarely studied. Drawing on an original survey of over 600 ridehailing drivers in two Chinese cities, Nanjing and Beijing, we conduct a political economy analysis for a three-party framework involving the municipal government, capital, and labour. We find that, in accordance with the "tolerant and prudent" principle, municipal governments stipulated regulations regarding the qualifications of ridehailing vehicles and drivers. These regulations, although they can help reduce labour precarity in the marketplace for licensed drivers, have exacerbated precarity in the workplace. Specifically, in response to the regulations, the ridehailing platforms aligned with thirdparty rental companies that provided licensed vehicles. This arrangement has effectively trapped many ridehailing drivers in the industry: our quantitative analysis shows that drivers bounded by a rental or rent-toown agreement worked significantly longer hours than counterparts who steered their own vehicles.

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