Rising Inequality as a Root Cause of the Present Crisis

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Abstract

The paper argues that the economic imbalances that caused the present crisis should be thought of as the outcome of the interaction of the effects of financial deregulation with the macroeconomic effects of rising inequality. In this sense rising inequality should be regarded as a root cause of the present crisis. We identify four channels by which it has contributed to the crisis. First, rising inequality creates a downward pressure on aggregate demand since it is poorer income groups that have high marginal propensities to consume. Second, international financial deregulation has allowed countries to run larger current account deficits and for longer time periods. Thus, in reaction to potentially stagnant demand two growth models have emerged: a debt-led model and an export-led model. Third, (in the debt-led growth models) higher inequality has led to higher household debt as working class families have tried to keep up with social consumption norms despite stagnating or falling real wages. Fourth, rising inequality has increased the propensity to speculate as richer households tend hold riskier financial assets than other groups. The rise of hedge funds and of subprime derivatives in particular has been linked to rise of the superrich.

Keywords: crisis, distribution, inequality, effective demand, growth regimes, post-Keynesian economics

JEL codes: E12, E25, E60

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1. Introduction

The recession that began in 2008 has been the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. The discussion of its causes usually focuses on defects in the financial system: incentives of bank managers; financial instruments that lacked transparency; an exaggerated trust in the ability of sophisticated statistical models to insure against risks; the shift from the originate-and-hold to the originate-and-distribute module of banking made possible by mortgage-backed securities; increasing international imbalances. The list could be continued and the literature on this is long and growing. What it shares in common is that it highlights malfunctions within the financial sector. While there can be no doubt that financial factors are critical in the making of the crisis, the present debate runs the danger of neglecting other socio-economic aspects. The rise of inequality has been one of the most profound changes in modern societies since the early 1980s. Several authors have recently highlighted that inequality may have played a role, but often without clarifying the mechanisms. This paper will explore the role that rising inequality has played in creating the preconditions of the crisis.

Since the early 1980s an increase in inequality has occurred in all OECD countries. At first sight, this seems to have taken on different forms in different countries. In the Anglo Saxon countries we observe a sharp increase in personal income inequality. Top incomes have experienced a spectacular growth (Piketty und Saez 2003, 2007; OECD 2008). Since 1980 the top income percentile has increased its share in national income by more than 10 percentage points. In continental European countries we see a strong decline in the functional distribution of income. Since 1980 the (adjusted) wage share has fallen by around 10 percentage point (of national income). Given the extent of redistribution that has taken place, one might expect that there are macroeconomic effects. While several authors have noticed that there might be a link between rising inequality and the crisis (Stiglitz 2010, Wade 2009, Rajan 2010), there is as of yet little systematic analysis. This article gives a conceptual framework, based on post-Keynesian theory, for the different channels through which rising inequality may have contributed to the crisis and, secondly, presents some preliminary evidence to substantiate these channels.

Our hypothesis is that the crisis should be understood as the interaction of the deregulation of the financial sector (or financialisation, more generally) with the effect of rising inequality. In a nutshell our story is the following: since the early 1980s the rise of Neoliberalism has brought about important economic and societal changes, including the deregulation of financial sector and various legislative measures that have weakened organised labour and the welfare state. From a macroeconomic point of view two growth models have emerged: a debt-led growth model and an export-led growth model. The USA and the UK are prime examples of the former, Germany and
China for the latter. Both growth models can be regarded as a reaction to the lack of domestic demand due to rising inequality. Potentially stagnating domestic demand is compensated for, in the first case, by debt-financed consumption and residential investment booms and, in the second case, by export demand. Several macroeconomic imbalances have emerged: growing trade imbalances across countries; rising household debt levels, namely in the debt-led economies; a rise in the size of the financial sector relative to others; and a rise of asset and property prices. These imbalances are at the root of the crisis. They have been facilitated by financial deregulation, but most of them are intrinsically linked to the rise of inequality.

The paper takes a view that is informed by Kaleckian macroeconomics and by French Regulation Theory. We identify four channels through which rising inequality has contributed to the crisis. Firstly, rising inequality creates a downward pressure on aggregate demand, since it is poorer income groups that have high marginal propensities to consume. Second, international financial deregulation has allowed countries to run large current account deficits and for extended time periods. Thus, in reaction to potentially stagnant domestic demand two growth models have emerged: a debt-led model and an export-led model. Third, (in the debt-led growth models) higher inequality has led to higher household debt as working class families have tried to keep up with social consumption norms despite stagnating or falling real wages. Fourth, rising inequality has increased the propensity to speculate as richer households tend hold riskier financial assets than other groups. The rise of hedge funds and of subprime derivatives in particular has been linked to rise of the superrich.

The paper will clarify these channels and present some (preliminary) evidence to substantiate these channels. Our analysis leads to the following research questions: is there evidence for the emergence of debt-led versus export-led growth models? Is there evidence for the effect of changes in income distribution on consumption demand and aggregate demand? Is there a link between rising inequality and rising debt levels? Has increased inequality contributed to a higher propensity for speculation?

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the crisis and its different phases. Section 3 makes some comments on the debate on the origins of the crisis. Section 4 documents the rise in inequality in the past decades. Section 5 discusses four channels through which rising inequality has contributed to the crisis and presents evidence for these channels. Section 6 concludes.
2. The crisis 2007-2011

In mid 2006 house prices in the USA started to decline. With hindsight, that probably marks the beginning of the crisis, but the US growth model had given rise to imbalances along several dimensions. Rapidly rising house prices, and the mortgage lending that came with it, had been the basis of a boom driven by credit-financed consumption and construction investment in the USA. The boom came with large current account surpluses and, due to financial innovation, the financial sector increased its assets and liabilities on a massive scale. This section gives a brief overview of the unfolding of the crisis itself.

The crisis broke out in spring 2007 in a seemingly obscure niche of the US financial system: the subprime market, which is the market for derivatives on low-quality mortgage credit; thus the initial name of the crisis as the subprime crisis. This is a rather small segment of the overall mortgage market, though it accounted for a substantial portion of the credit growth in the years before the crisis. As subprime credit is, by definition, of low quality, it was the natural field for a securitization of these loans that was supposed to reduce risk (e.g. IMF 2006). What was going on here was the extreme form of what happened on a much broader scale in the entire mortgage industry. In August 2007 the crisis spilt over into the interbank market, where banks lend to each other, usually very short term. The interbank market is at the very centre of the modern financial system. Interest rates rose to more than one percentage point above those on government bonds. This increase in the risk premium of lending reflected that banks did not trust each other. And rightly so, as it turned out. Central banks reacted quickly and pumped billions (of dollars and Euros) into the market to maintain liquidity.

However, while the interbank market stabilized, the crisis evolved. In spring 2008 Bear Stearns, one of the leading investment banks, was bankrupt and could only be sold with the FED guaranteeing some 20 bn US$ worth of assets. A first (small) fiscal stimulus packet was implemented in the USA. At this stage the impact of the crisis on the real economy outside the USA was limited. In August/September 2008 the crisis turned into a full scale financial crisis – and it did so with a bang: Lehman Brothers, one of Wall Street’s leading investment banks, went bankrupt. The end of the world (or at least of big finance) as we knew it seemed to have arrived. Interest rates soared (interest rate spreads rose to several percentage points) and liquidity froze.

Again governments reacted. The principles of neoliberal free-market economics were suspended for a few weeks. Central banks provided more liquidity, but that proved insufficient to stabilize markets. Governments had to intervene directly: in the U.S., AIG, an insurance firm that had insured huge volumes of credit derivates, was taken over by the state, as were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
two state-sponsored mortgage refinancing giants. Within a few weeks European countries followed suit with the recapitalization of financial institutions and massive guarantees for interbank credits becoming mainstream economic policy. Recapitalization meant that governments effectively nationalized (fully or partly) financial institutions – but governments abstained from interfering with the management of banks despite obvious management failures. In late October 2008 an EU summit issued a statement that no systemically important financial institutions would be allowed to fail – a capitalism without bankruptcies (of big banks) was declared!

By fall 2008 the financial crisis had turned into a full blown economic crisis. World trade contracted by more than 20% and GDP in most developed countries shrank at a speed not seen since the 1930s (in most countries by around 5%). And it not only hit those countries that had experienced property bubbles, but also countries like Germany and Japan where property prices had been practically flat; it spread as well to emerging countries. Eastern European countries were particularly bad hit, with the Baltic countries suffering GDP declines of around 20%. The IMF had to be called in to save Hungary, Pakistan and the Baltic states. But the most conspicuous symbol of the downturn was certainly the fall of GM: once the world’s largest firm and employer, it now had to rescued by the US government.

While complete meltdown seemed imminent in fall 2008, in the course of spring 2009 it became clear that the – historically unprecedented – scale of government intervention had prevented outright collapse. A cascade of bank breakdowns could only be prevented by rescue packages that amounted to 80% of GDP in the USA and the UK (UNCTAD 2009, Table 1.8) and by the FED expanding its balance sheet by a trillion US$, mostly by acquiring assets that it would not have touched in normal times. Risk premia remained elevated, banks were making phenomenal losses, unemployment started rising, but normality of a sort returned. The pressure to reform the system had receded. Earlier declarations of a fundamental restructuring of the financial system (e.g. the G20 meeting of Nov. 2008) had been forgotten and the debate on reform turned into specialists’ debate about technicalities, with all but private bankers and central bankers being excluded from decision making circles. The arrogance of the financial elite, however, is best captured by the fact that, in spite of the obvious disaster in finance, bankers’ bonuses returned to pre-crisis levels.

But the normality that was about to restore itself was not quite the normality existing before the crisis. After all, the crisis was by no means over, though for the bankers it seemed so. For large parts of the population, it had only just had begun. Production fell and unemployment rose. In the USA foreclosures were rising. People lost their jobs and their homes. And there was another devastating effect of the crisis: budget deficits were increasing, surpassing 10% of GDP in many cases, with public
debt increasing accordingly. Financial markets started to worry whether governments would be able to pay their debts. So in the course of 2009 the crisis thus took its next turn: a **sovereign debt crisis**. Its most prominent victim was to be Greece and with it the Euro system. In terms of economic policy there has been a shift towards austerity.

In early 2010 Greece faced punitive interest rates on its (public) debt issues. Greece had fudged public debt statistics (with the help of leading Wall Street banks) and now had difficulties refinancing its debt. Indeed, what had been exposed was a fundamental flaw in the construction of the Euro system. With exchange rates frozen, the southern countries had, despite much lower inflation since adopting the Euro, slowly but steadily lost competitiveness to Germany and its economic satellites. Germany’s net exports (mostly to other Euro countries) amounted to more than 5% of GDP, achieved largely by wage suppression and, consequently, low inflation rates (Lapavitsas et al 2010). The Euro area had no instruments to deal with the internal imbalances that emerged, other than trusting in labour market flexibility to adjust price levels in the nations of the Euro area to bring about stability (Stockhammer 2011).

While it was relatively simple to blame the Greek crisis on irresponsible fiscal policy the structural problems of the Euro area were illustrated by the Irish crisis shortly thereafter. Ireland had government surpluses before the crisis, but still needed a huge rescue package (€ 85 bn, more than half of Irish GDP). As in Greece, the rescue package was really one for the European financial sector rather than for states. Ireland had experienced an enormous real estate bubble that burst und effectively bankrupted its banks. Because of the bank bailouts, Irish debt soared by 40 percentage points of GDP from 2007 to 2010. Literally all of the obligations of the bust Irish banking system were guaranteed, which led to an angry article by Eichengreen (2010).

The Euro crisis is still going on at the time of writing. While the economic situation is desperate in Greece, the bigger danger for the Euro is posed by Italian and Spanish debt markets. But the underlying problem is a European one: European countries have given up on independent monetary policy, but there are no effective institutions and fiscal transfers in place that would stabilise these countries in times of crisis. Rather the crisis is amplified by pro-cyclical austerity policies that are increasingly imposed by Brussels (and Berlin).

### 3. The debate on causes of the crisis

Many insightful contributions to the debate on the causes of the crisis emphasize microeconomic factors. They come in different versions. First, there are contributions that highlight incentives for
bank managers that encourage risk taking (Roubini and Mihm 2010) and the extensive use of statistical models that were aimed at diversifying risk and equated risks with past volatility (based on short time series) and underestimated the correlation of risks in the event of a crisis. These arguments discuss problems within the private sector and, typically, assume rational behaviour. Second, there is a group of arguments highlighting wrong incentives created by government institutions. A prime example is the Basle II accord, which is thought to have created incentives for private banks to shift activities off-balance to minimize adherence to capital requirements. Rajan (2009) argues that successive US governments have encouraged lending to the poor through state-backed mortgage refinancing institutions. Implicitly these arguments assume rational behaviour on part of private actors. Third, there is a growing behavioural finance literature that suggests that people, even financial investors, often don’t act rationally and are prone to irrational exuberance (Akerlof and Shiller 2009).

As modern economics is dominated by a microeconomic approach it is perhaps not surprising that the macroeconomic dimension is less prominent. Two factors stand out in the debate. First, there is a growing interest in debt-cycle and debt-deflation models. Rising property prices (in the USA) are a key element, helping to engender a substantial rise in household debt. For whatever reason, the private savings ratio had been on a declining trend in the decades before the crisis – consumption was in part being financed by rising debt. Rising house prices were also central for the (residential) investment boom that parts of the USA, Spain and Ireland had witnessed.

A second macroeconomic factor that has received widespread attention has been the rising international trade imbalances and increases in capital flows. The USA had experienced massive capital inflows (and trade deficits) prior to the crisis. There is no consensus as to whether trade imbalances or savings decisions drove capital flows – or whether capital flows have been driving asset prices and macroeconomic performance, but there is a widespread perception that international imbalances had something to do with the crisis. The ‘savings glut’ hypothesis of Bernanke (2005) essentially blamed south East Asian central banks for the imbalances (as if the inflows were forced upon the USA). Borio and Disyatat (2011) argue that capital flows are not due to savings decisions, but to portfolio decisions and that they are prone to large swings due to what they call an excess elasticity of the financial system. Without much theoretical ado, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) have shown that episodes of capital inflows (‘capital flow bonanzas’) typically lead to speculative bubbles on financial markets and property markets and, ultimately, to financial crises.

Figure 1 summarises the macroeconomic mechanisms of the crisis that have been highlighted in the literature graphically. Changes in the financial system, due to the deregulation (or wrong regulation)
allowed for a bubble on financial and property markets, which in turn allowed for the massive increase in household debt. Rising household debt levels fuelled consumption expenditures and residential investment and thus led to economic growth that also resulted in current account deficits. The resulting capital inflows, in turn, helped keep interest rates low and fuelled the bubbles.

Figure 1. Standard crisis explanation

There is disagreement about the microeconomic dimension for these developments. These range from neoclassical approaches that highlight government (regulation failure), behavioural economics, which highlights irrational behaviour, to post-Keynesian approaches that highlight, in the tradition of Hyman Minsky, the intrinsic and endogenous instability of the financial system, which has been amplified by financial deregulation. Some commentators have emphasised a parallel between the rising inequality of the 1920s and the present crisis (Livingston 2009). Usually these arguments remain rudimentary. The discussion that follows will present a post-Keynesian and regulationist framework for the inequality argument and substantiate some the channels empirically.

4. Rising inequality

Income distribution has experienced dramatic changes in the last decades. And there are remarkable differences across countries. Since 1980 (adjusted) wage shares have fallen by some ten percentage points in continental European countries, and even more in Japan (Figure 2). The decline in the USA and the UK was moderate and is around five percentage points. The Anglo Saxon countries, on the other hand, experienced a much more dramatic change in personal income distribution (Figure 3). In the USA the top 1% of the income distribution has increased its share in national income from 8% (1980) to above 21% (2005). Developments in other English-speaking countries are similar. In continental European countries and Japan personal income has become more unequal, but to a much more moderate degree. The dramatic rise in personal inequality is, to a significant extent, due to sharply rising management remuneration (in English-speaking countries). These are counted as labour costs in the national account and thus form part of the wage share. If management salaries were counted as distributed profits, i.e. adjusting the US wage share for the wage payments of top income percentile, it looks much more like European wage shares. Overall, increasing inequality has thus resulted in stagnating incomes for the working classes (in the USA real median wages have grown by a total of 2.8% in the quarter century from 1980 to 2005; OECD 2008), whereas profit
incomes have increased sharply, even as the form that this increase has taken differs across countries.

Figure 2

Figure 3

These dramatic changes in income distribution still await satisfactory explanation. Several studies have tried to quantitatively identifying its causes. Remarkably, recently several mainstream studies have addressed the issue of changes in functional income distribution. IMF (2007a) and European Commission (2007) identify technological change as the main determinant of changes in the wage share in OECD countries; globalisation is considered a secondary factor. Stockhammer (2012) argues that these results are not robust and finds that financialisation, globalisation and welfare state retrenchment all have contributed to falling wages shares and that technological change only had moderate effects. Financialisation had also been highlighted by ILO (2008), though without econometric evidence. Rodrik (1998), Harrison (2002) und Jayadev (2007) showed for a sample of developing and developed economies that globalisation has had negative effects on the wage share. Onaran (2009) shows for a four emerging economies that financial crisis have long-lasting effects on income distribution.

5. Rising inequality and the causes of the crisis: four channels

There is an obvious parallel between the present crisis and that of the 1930s: both were preceded by sharp increases in inequality. This has led some authors to speculate about a possible connection between the two phenomena (Livingston 2009), but there are yet few studies that detail the causal relation. This section discusses four channels through which rising inequality has contributed to the imbalances that caused the crisis. These channels operate in interaction with financial factors. Our explanation has some similarities with Horn and van Treeck (2011), who identify inequality, international imbalances and under-regulated financial markets as the causes of the crisis.

Channel 1: Rising inequality has led to stagnating domestic demand, namely consumption demand.
Section 4 presented evidence for the dramatic changes in income distribution that occurred in the past 30 years. What are the macroeconomic effects of this redistribution? More precisely, what are its effects on aggregate demand? First, other things equal, one would expect a falling wage share to have a negative effect on consumption demand: wage earners, and especially the poor, will have a higher consumption propensity than recipients of profit incomes. Second, a falling wage share, i.e. a rising profit share, ought to have positive effect on investment expenditures (at least for a given level of demand). Third, a falling wage share in any one county ought to have a positive effect on net exports as competitiveness increases. This last effect, however, is not relevant in our context, as wage shares have fallen in all countries. The total or net effect of a change in wage share on aggregate demand is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the relative size of the partial effects. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) proposed a post-Kaleckian macro model that encompasses these three effects. It allows for aggregate demand to be either wage led or profit led. A wage-led demand regime is one where an increase in the wage share leads to higher aggregate demand, which will occur if the consumption effect in larger than the investment and net export effect. A profit-led demand regime is one, where an increase the wage share has a negative effect on aggregate demand. The Kaleckian hypothesis is that (at least as far as the domestic components are concerned) demand is wage led.

This model has inspired a series of empirical studies including Bowles and Boyer (1995), Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), Naastepad and Storm (2006/07), Hein and Vogel (2008), Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011), Onaran and Galanis (2012). For example Stockhammer et al. (2009) find a consumption differential of around 0.4 for the Euro area. Thus the decline in the wage share by around ten percentage points would have led to a reduction of consumption by four percentage points of GDP.

The effects of changes in personal income distribution on consumption demand are more straightforward, as standard consumption theory predicts that the poor will have higher marginal consumption propensity than the rich. To illustrate, Stein (2009) reports that, for Germany, in 2007 the top quartile had an average saving rate of 15.8%, the second quartile of 9%, the third of 8% and the bottom quartile 4.1%. Indeed saving differentials across income groups have increased, with the difference between the top and the bottom quartile increasing from 5.5% in 1995 to 11.7%. [OECD?] The increase in the saving differential is, according to Stein, due to increasing inequality in this period. Brenke (2011) argues that rising inequality has been an important contributing factor to Germany’s weak consumption demand.
Channel 1 argues that rising inequality has, other things equal, a negative effect on consumption expenditures and thus on aggregate demand. Other things, however, were not equal during neoliberalism.

Channel 2: The deregulation of international capital flows has relaxed the external balance constraint and allowed countries to run larger current account deficits. This has allowed for the development of two distinct growth models: a debt-led growth model that came with a consumption boom and current account deficits, and an export-led growth model.

Figure 4 plots the standard deviation of current account positions of OECD countries. This is a measure of international imbalances. The figure illustrates that international imbalances did not occur recently, but are part of a longer term trend: the liberalisation of capital flows after Bretton Woods did not lead to stable exchange rates, but rather to increasing international imbalances because exchange rates are increasingly determined by capital flows rather than trade balances. As capital flows have financial, often speculative, motives and are typically pro-cyclical, the deregulation of international capital flows has loosened external trade constraints. It has allowed countries to run larger current account deficits for longer periods (compared to the Bretton Woods period). Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) show that episodes of strong capital inflows ('capital flow bonanzas') usually come with speculative bubbles on financial and property markets and typically end in recessions.

Figure 4 [std deviation current account]

Financial globalisation has thus ironically increased the room for different developments across countries. Current account imbalances can be maintained for longer – essentially as long as markets trust the situation. This is the background to the emergence of two different growth models.

The imbalances at the eve of the crisis are well known. In 2007 Germany had a current account surplus of 7.5% of GDP; the USA had a deficit of 5.07% (OECD.stats, accessed Feb 2012). Figure 4 suggest that these imbalances are part of a long-term trend. Our hypothesis is that these imbalances are the expression and results of different growth models that developed in different countries. More specifically, we argue that countries can be usefully grouped in debt-led growth models and
export-led growth models. Importantly, we interpret these models as a reaction to the same underlying problem: stagnating domestic demand due to rising inequality. Table 1 classifies some important countries. Debt-led and finance-led growth models exist in core as well as in peripheral countries. While on a global scale the debt-led economies were at the core, within the Euro area, the roles are reversed and the export-led economies are at the centre and debt-led growth took place in the periphery.

Table 1

The historical paths that led the countries to their positions in Table 1 are complex and we make no claim of being able to explain them here. Financial institutions as well as industrial relations and industrial policy play a role. The USA and the UK have long been leading examples of market-based financial systems and they led the way in neoliberal financial deregulation of the 1970s and 80s. In particular in the USA home ownership has a special economic and ideological connotation. For the countries of the European periphery financial liberalisation was very much an outcome of European integration, one which imposed the liberalisation of capital flows and provided the framework for capital inflows. There is also an aspect of historical continuity on the side of the export-led model, complemented by a new dynamic due to changing circumstances. Germany has long had an export-oriented growth strategy. The entire era of European integration is marked by German surpluses and subsequent revaluations. However, German demand composition only tilts decisively towards an export-led growth model after unification and the introduction of the Euro (Horn et al. 2010). In Japan the export-led growth model is arguably a reaction to its debt-led growth model going into reverse after 1992. In the emerging economies of South East Asia, export-led growth is in part a reaction to the humiliating experience of the crisis 1097/98, and, certainly in the case of China, the result of strategy of undervaluation in order to accumulate reserves.

Given the contrasting current account positions, it is hardly surprising that countries have different compositions of final demand. Figure 5 illustrates the stark difference in consumption shares across

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1 No particular weight is given to names. What we label ‘debt-led’ has been called financialized, finance-led models. Our ‘export-led’ model has also been called neo-mercantilist. Hein and Mundt (2012) offer a more detailed analysis of debt-led and export-led growth models. The conceptual distinction is found in Becker (2002).
countries. Whereas debt-led economies have typically experienced a substantial increase in the consumption share, export-led economies have experienced a decline in the consumption share.

Figure 5

Increases in the consumption share have typically been accompanied by increases in household debt. Table 2 shows the in household debt in percent of GDP as well as its change from 2000 to 2008. We focus on the change in household debt rather than on its level, because, arguably increases in debt (rather than a level of debt) can feed consumption expenditures. For the stability of the growth regime, of course the change as well as the level of debt may be important. While household debt declined in Germany from 2000 to 2008 by 11 percentage points of GDP (and it increased in Austria by a moderate 7%-points), household debt rose by 26 percentage points in the USA and by 28 percentage points in the UK. In peripheral Europe the increases were even sharper (though levels in Mediterranean Europe were usually low). In Ireland it rose by 61, in Spain by 33 percentage points.2

Table 2 [HH debt]

Overall, our crude classification in debt-led and export-led growth models seems consistent with the data: countries with current account deficits are also those with higher increases in household debt. The USA and the UK on the one side and Germany and Japan on the other are prime example of these growth models. The classification also is helpful in understanding developments in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. The Irish case, admittedly, is somewhat more complicated as Ireland had, at the same time current account deficits and net export surpluses, the difference being explained by repatriated profits. The Irish external position deteriorated in the decade prior to the crisis. Several countries would, however, not fit neatly into our dichotomy, for example the new member states in central and eastern Europe, but also the Netherlands and Denmark, which seem to have had, at the same time, sharp increases in household debt and export surpluses. Notably these are small countries.

2 We were unable to find comparable data for Japan. Girouard et al (2006, Figure 1) report falling household debt levels from 1995 to 2004.
Channel 3. Rising inequality contributed to household debt (in the debt-led models).

The distribution of household debt is an under-researched topic. Primary data are often not readily available and, where they are, they usually not reported in a form that would encourage distributional analysis. For the USA, data are available and will be discussed below.

In the literature there are opposite views on the distributional dimension of rising household debt in the USA. On the one hand Barba and Pivetti argue that ‘rising household indebtedness should be seen principally as a response to stagnant real wages and retrenchments in the welfare state, i.e. as the counterpart of enduring changes in income distribution’ (Barba and Pivetti 2009, 114); rising inequality has thus contributed to household debt in that the poor were driven into debt by declining wages and social services. On the other hand, it has been argued that rising household debt, and more precisely falling saving rates, is due to the behaviour of the rich. Maki and Palumbo claim that ‘all of the consumption boom really can be attributed to the richest groups of households’ (Maki und Palumbo, 2001, 22). This argument has been cited widely, including by Marxist authors (Brenner, Glyn 2006). While rising household debt is related to rising inequality in this story, it is not the poor who are accumulating debt, but it is the top end of the distribution.

The study by Maki and Palumbo was one of the first on this topic. They analyse wealth effects in the consumption behaviour of US households based on data of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1992 to 2000. The SCF also formed the basis for later studies that yielded different results. Some comments are in place. First, their study focuses on saving rates rather than on debt levels. While it is tempting to assume that the groups that reduced their saving rates are also the ones whose debt levels increased, this need not be the case. Second, their study focuses on the 1990s, i.e. the period in the run up to the dot com bubble. In this period, arguably gains in wealth were concentrated in financial assets that are more highly concentrated than the gains in housing wealth that took place in the 2000s. Third, later studies are unable to replicate the findings of Maki and Palumbo. Bibow (2010) finds that the decline in the saving can be attributed to home owners.

While Barba and Pivetti (2009) do not present empirical analysis, Wolff (2010) offers extensive analysis of primary data. He argues that the increase in household debt is due mostly to the attempts of middle class households to maintain their consumption position in the face of falling or stagnating real wages. Maintaining social status was only possible through increasing debt.

Kennickell (2009) gives an extensive overview of the results of various cohorts of SCF data from 1989 to 2007. We will use this study to illustrate the different points. Table 3 summarises the share of
debts held by different income groups. Kennickell groups them into the bottom 50%, the 50-90th percentile, the 90-95th percentile, the 95-99th percentile and the top percentile. Looking at the distribution of debt over time, the overall impression is one of stability. (As the SCF is based on a small sample, not all fluctuations necessarily reflect changes in the underlying population.) The bottom 90% of the distribution had 74.9% of all household debt in 1989 and 73.3% in 2007.

Table 3 [debt by income group.]

Debt has to be serviced out of current income. And the distribution of current income had changed in the relevant period. Table 4 thus summarises the debt-to-income ratio by income group. This gives a very different picture. There is a clear trend: relative to income, debt has increased more sharply in lower income groups. The debt-to-income ratio for the bottom 50% increased from 61% (1989) to 137% (2007); for the next 40 percentiles it increased from 81% to 148%; while the debt to income ratios also increased for the top 10% of the income distribution, the dynamic was a much weaker one.

Table 4 [debt-to-income by income group.]

Thus while the distribution of debt has remained rather stable, debt relative to income has increased more for lower income groups. In this sense the hypothesis that lower income groups have been driven into debt by falling wages (and social services) is consistent with the data.

Channel 4. Rising inequality has increased the propensity to speculate.

There is a widespread perception that increasing inequality, and in particular the growth of small group of superrich individuals has contributed to the total ‘propensity to speculate’. The intuition behind this perception is that, with increasing income, the consumption possibilities get exhausted and speculative use of wealth increases. For example Huffschmied (2002), argues that increasing inequality has resulted in ‘excess liquidity’ that has had an inflationary effect on the prices of financial assets. The term excess liquidity is somewhat confusing in this context, but the intuition is
clear enough: because of the growth of the superrich there is an increased volume of wealth that is looking for risky investment.

However, there are few empirical studies on this topic. This is due to conceptual as well as empirical difficulties. Conceptually it is difficult to operationalise the concept of speculation. We use the term pragmatically, in the sense of risky investment strategies. Empirically the problem is that data availability on wealth distribution is extremely poor.

SCF data confirms that rich household hold riskier assets. In 2007 the top10% of the income held 60.5% of the holdings of checking, savings, money market and call accounts and 50.3% of the holdings of certificates of deposits, but 90.4% of direct holdings of stocks and 87.9% of bonds, 51.9% of mutual funds and hedge funds (Kennickell 2009, Figure A3a). This lends itself to the conclusion that a shift in wealth distribution in favour of the rich would also result in a shift towards riskier portfolios of financial assets. Things are more complicated as regards with regard to non-financial wealth: principal residences are the largest form of non-financial wealth and the bottom 90% hold (in 2007) 61.5% of that wealth – and they have turned out to be quite a risky asset.

Photis Lysandrou (2011) sheds light on a particular mechanism by which rising (wealth) inequality has contributed to the crisis. Lysandrou argues that, firstly, the crisis broke out in the market for derivatives on subprime loans. Second, this market segment developed so substantially because hedge funds demanded these high-risk and (at the time it seemed) high-return assets. These assets are not off the shelf, but were created by investment banks to fit the demands of hedge funds. Third, hedge funds are by and large an investment vehicle for the super-rich (at a later stage institutional investors increasingly invested in hedge funds): ‘the chief driving force behind the creation of the structured credit products that triggered the crisis was a global excess demand for investable securities and that key to the build-up of this excess demand was the huge accumulation of private wealth’ (Lysandrou 2011, 3).

Hedge funds held about half of all CDOs (Lysandrou 2011, Fig 9). The assets managed by hedge funds grow fourfold between 2000 and 2007, which explained their strong demand for exotic financial instruments. Because of their high minimum investment requirements hedge funds are primarily for superrich individuals (‘high net wealth individuals’) and, more recently, institutional investors, which want to hold some high risk assets. Whereas hedge funds were essentially catering rich individuals in 2000, by 2007 almost half of their assets came from institutional investors. Lysandrou identifies the superrich as what is called High Net Wealth Individuals (HNWI), who own net wealth of more than a million US$. HNWI own about one fifth of all financial assets, but more than half of alternative
investment assets, which include CDOs and other derivatives (Lysandrou 2011, Tab 1). Lysandrou concludes: ‘A major policy implication that follows from the above analysis is that the world’s wealth has to be more equitably distributed if global financial crises are to be avoided’ (Lysandrou 2011, 22).

6. Conclusion

This paper has investigated the question whether rising inequality has contributed to the imbalances that erupted in the present crisis, in other words, whether rising inequality is a cause of the crisis. We have discussed four channels through which inequality may have contributed. This is not to be understood as an alternative to financial factors, but as a complementary explanation that highlights the interaction of financial and social factors. First, increasing inequality leads potentially to a stagnation of demand, since lower income groups have higher consumption propensity. Second, countries developed two alternative strategies to deal with this shortfall of demand. In the English-speaking countries (and in Mediterranean countries), a debt-led growth model emerged, in contrast with the export-led growth model in countries such as Germany, Japan or China. These two growth models became feasible because financial liberalisation of international capital flows allowed for unprecedented international imbalances. Third, in debt-led countries rising inequality contributed to the growth of debt as the poor have increased their debt levels relative to income faster than the rich. For the USA this can be clearly seen in debt-to-income ratios for different income groups. Financialization has meant debt growth instead of wage growth. This growth model that is not sustainable. Fourth, increasing inequality has increased the propensity to speculate, i.e. it has led to a shift to more risky financial assets. One particular aspect of these developments is that subprime derivatives, the segment where the financial crisis broke out in 2008, were developed to cater to the demands of hedge funds that manage the assets of the superrich. Increasing inequality has thus played a role in the origin of the imbalances that erupted in the crisis as well as in the demand for the very assets in which the crisis broke out. Our conclusion that increasing inequality, in interaction with financial deregulation, should be seen as root causes of the crisis. Figure 6 summarises our argument graphically.

Figure 6. Rising inequality and the causes of crisis
This argument has direct implications for economic policy. A broad consensus exists that financial reform is necessary to avert similar crises in the future (even if little has yet changed in the regulation of financial markets). The analysis here highlights that income distribution will have to be a central consideration in policies dealing with domestic and international macroeconomic stabilisation. The avoidance of crises similar to the recent one and the generation of stable growth regimes will involve simultaneous consideration of income and wealth distribution, financial regulation and aggregate demand. It is this first element – the distribution of income and wealth – that has not conventionally been incorporated in macroeconomic analysis. Put more bluntly, creating a more equal society is not an economic luxury that can be taken care of after the real issues, such as financial regulation, have been sorted out. Rather, a far more equitable distribution of income and wealth than presently exists would be an essential aspect of a stable growth regime: wage growth is a precondition of an increase in consumption that does not rely on the growth of debt. And financial assets are less likely to be used for speculation if wealth is more broadly distributed.

A more equitable distribution of income and wealth will involve changes in tax as well as in wage policy. Reformed tax policies will include increases in upper income tax rates, rises in wealth taxes and the closure of tax loopholes and of tax havens (Shaxson 2011). In the area of wage policy far reaching changes are necessary. Present policy prescriptions aim at cutting wages in a recession. But higher wage growth is a necessary aspect of a balanced economy. It can only be achieved by strengthening of labour union and collective bargaining structures.

7. References


Hein, E., Vogel, L. (2008): Distribution and growth reconsidered – empirical results for Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 32 (3), 479-511


Livingston, James, 2009. Their Great Depression and ours. *Challenge* 52, 3, 34-51


Figure 1. The standard view of the crisis

- Financial deregulation
- Rising household debt
- Bubbles on financial and real estate markets
- Debt-led growth
- Current account deficits
- Capital inflows
Figure 2. Adjusted wage share in major economies

Source: AMECO³

³ http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm
Figure 3. Income share of the top 1% of the income distribution in USA, UK, France, Sweden and Japan

Note: There is a (minor) break in the UK series in 1990.

Figure 4. Standard deviation of the current account as % of GDP across OECD countries

Source: AMECO
Figure 5. Consumption as a share of final demand in the USA, UK, Germany, France and Japan

Consumption to final demand ratio

Source: AMECO
Figure 6. Rising inequality and financial deregulation as causes of the crisis

Rising inequality

Financial deregulation

Rising household debt

Bubbles on financial and real estate markets

Stagnant domestic demand

Two growth models

Debt-led growth

Export-led growth

Current account deficits

Capital inflows

Current account surpluses

Capital outflows

Export-led growth

Stagnant domestic demand

Two growth models

Debt-led growth

Export-led growth

Current account deficits

Capital inflows

Current account surpluses

Capital outflows
Table 1. Debt-led and export-led growth models in core and periphery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Growth model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debt-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>USA, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Household debt (in % of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Change 2000-08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>70.21</td>
<td>96.35</td>
<td>26.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>75.16</td>
<td>107.43</td>
<td>32.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>51.55</td>
<td>114.26</td>
<td>62.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>19.83</td>
<td>55.29</td>
<td>35.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>54.22</td>
<td>88.06</td>
<td>33.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>74.96</td>
<td>102.34</td>
<td>27.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>35.29</td>
<td>53.61</td>
<td>18.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>73.41</td>
<td>61.70</td>
<td>-11.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>47.13</td>
<td>55.04</td>
<td>7.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>74.76</td>
<td>77.70</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>86.98</td>
<td>119.81</td>
<td>32.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ireland 2001-08
Source: Eurostat, expect USA (Flows of Funds)
Table 3. Debt shares by income group, USA 1989-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentile of the distribution of family net worth</th>
<th>0-50</th>
<th>50-90</th>
<th>90-95</th>
<th>95-99</th>
<th>99-100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kennickell (2009)
Table 4. Debt-to-income by income groups, USA 1989-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0-50</th>
<th>50-90</th>
<th>90-95</th>
<th>95-99</th>
<th>99-100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kennickell (2009)
Table 5. Distribution of financial assets across income groups, USA 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holdings of checking, savings, money market, and call accounts</th>
<th>Percentile of the distribution of family net worth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holdings of certificates of deposit</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct holdings of publicly traded stocks</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual funds other than money market mutual funds, and hedge funds</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kennickel (2009), Table A3a